



CIO Viewpoint FX

October 11, 2024

Authors:

Dr. Dirk Steffen
Chief Investment Officer EMEA

Kaniz Rupani
Investment Strategist

Michael Blumenroth
Senior Investment Strategist

Andreas Umsonst
Investment Officer EMEA

Key takeaways

- The ECB entered the interest rate cut cycle three months earlier than the Fed. However, since late summer the FX markets have been focusing on the Fed, which then made a bold first interest rate cut. The respective future interest rate paths are likely to have a decisive influence on the price of the currency pair.
- After another interest rate hike by the BoJ and a massive unwinding of "carry trades", the yen was by far the strongest G10 currency in Q3. Further monetary policy action by the Fed and the BoJ is likely to remain price-determining.
- In the wake of the JPY appreciation and the announcement of massive stimulus by the central bank and the government of China, the CNY also appreciated noticeably. The U.S. elections remain an extremely important factor.

EUR/USD: Fed cuts could be overpriced

USD and EUR: If we start by looking at the first half of this year, the EUR/USD exchange rate traded in its narrowest range for a six-month period since the introduction of the single currency. Broadly speaking, the currency pair has moved between EUR/USD 1.1047 – which marked the EUR's high at the beginning of the year – and EUR/USD 1.0601 in mid-April.

Short-term market movements were usually triggered by either inflation data, the search for so-called "safe havens" during (geo)political conflicts or changed expectations regarding the respective monetary policy of the Fed and the ECB.

With the ECB's interest rate reversal in June, the cards had been laid on the table. The comments of several ECB governors indicated quite strongly that interest rate cuts should be made on a quarterly basis. On September 12, the ECB acted again, and another interest rate cut on December 12 seems almost certain. For the meeting on October 17, the swap markets were still divided for a while.

Leading indicators such as the PMI data currently point to continued weakness in the Eurozone economy, especially in the industrial sector. However, persistently high core and service inflation data are likely to serve as a warning to the ECB to exercise caution. Nevertheless, following some rather dovish statements by ECB President Lagarde, the swap markets are now pricing in an interest rate cut in mid-October with a 95% probability at the time of writing these lines.

Looking at Fed monetary policy, for much of Q2 many market participants had heavily priced out interest rate cuts by the Fed.

Central banks at the helm

At the beginning of Q3, this changed relatively quickly. Some U.S. labour market data indicated the first signs of weakness. The July report in particular was interpreted by many market participants as another setback for the U.S. economy, as the unemployment rate rose from 4.1% to 4.3%. In combination with the key interest rate hike in Japan, this resulted in major market turbulence for a short time.

Many market participants may have been somewhat surprised that the USD did not assume its usual role as a "safe haven" during the market turbulence. The biggest driver behind recent USD weakness has been the sharp repricing of Fed expectations, which were more consistent with U.S. recessionary dynamics than the soft landing indicated by the data. Of course, no one can rule out a U.S. recession in good conscience, but the data simply does not support such a scenario – for now, at least.

Nevertheless, on September 18, the Fed entered the interest rate cut cycle with a step of 50 basis points (bps), which many had not been expecting. Jerome Powell's Jackson Hole speech on August 23 had opened up the possibility of an alternative path to aggressive easing: a Fed that is convinced that the inflation target has been achieved, so it pivots to sizeable, pre-emptive reflationary cuts this year to protect the labour market, even without a recession. It should not be forgotten that the Fed has a dual mandate to keep inflation in check and to support the labour market.

The labour market data for August published at the beginning of September did not necessarily suggest the eventual decision to implement a jumbo interest rate hike of 50 bps. However, the speeches of FOMC members had focused more and more on developments in the labour market. It seems as if the Fed wants to avoid being held responsible for a further weakening of the labour market.

With the Fed now having entered the rate cut cycle robustly, there are several possible implications:

- a) It led to a drop in U.S. real rates and a steepening of the U.S. Treasury yield curve, which put pressure on the USD.
- b) The Fed's easing cycle at a faster pace and ahead of other central banks could lead to a material tightening in front-end interest rate differentials – not against all, but at least many currencies.
- c) It could encourage the market to price even lower terminal rates because it would imply the Fed views terminal rates as being a long way away from current levels. However, this effect is not entirely clear. The early, significant interest rate cut is likely to support the economy, which in the medium term means that the Fed does not have to cut key interest rates as much for economic reasons as it would have had to do with a first interest rate hike of 25 bps.



At the time of writing, following the very strong U.S. labour market report for September, roughly 50 bps of interest rate cuts by the end of 2024 are priced in, for both the Fed and the ECB. The U.S. payrolls release on November 1 is likely to determine the expectations for the Fed's monetary policy, and the short-term path of the EUR/USD currency pair.

However, there are some reasons why the USD could be valued higher against the EUR by the end of the year and into our forecast period to September 2025 than it is now.

- We are not yet convinced the Fed intends to go down such an aggressive rate cut path as currently priced in the Fed funds futures, but we expect it to be gradual and measured instead. The baseline scenario is 25 bps steps in the context of upcoming Fed meetings. And fewer cuts than priced in by Fed Funds Futures.
- And, compared to the Eurozone, U.S. growth exceptionalism remains intact. It therefore seems very unlikely that the Fed will need to cut key interest rates aggressively to support the labour market.
- The "Trump 2.0 Trade" priced in July (corporate tax cuts and higher import tariffs create upward pressure on inflation and prevent more aggressive Fed rate cuts) seems to be fully priced out currently. However, a return to the White House for Donald Trump cannot be ruled out. Also, hardly any geopolitical risks seem to be priced in on the markets (e.g. a further escalation in the Middle East). A change in geopolitical conditions or election forecasts in the U.S. could provide a tailwind for the USD again.

And, another U.S. labour market report that is better than expected by analysts could revive the expectation of a no landing scenario. The labour market in the Eurozone remains tense, but the leading indicators and hard economic data tend to point to a stagnating economy in contrast to the U.S. We therefore suspect that the ECB's future monetary policy decisions are priced in relatively fairly in swap markets, but are likely to be too aggressive for the Fed.

So it seems – still – premature to sing a swansong to the USD. If the U.S. labour market weakens much more than expected, then the picture could quickly change again. However, currently we do not expect this to happen.

Our 12-month target for EUR/USD is 1.08.

JPY: Gradual appreciation

JPY: The JPY has seen notable fluctuations against the USD in 2024. Between the beginning of the year and early July, it had plunged to over USD/JPY 160, marking a drop of around 15%. However, by early August it bounced back to around 144 and further in mid-September to 140.6.

This rebound was driven not just by the Bank of Japan (BoJ) rate hike, but mainly by the aggressive repricing of a Fed rate cut in August and a larger 50 bps cut by the Fed in September. Moreover, the JPY's rise sparked the unwinding of long-standing JPY carry trades. In essence, the potential fluctuations of the USD/JPY pair may be linked to the BoJ's policy moves, Japan's economic developments, and expectations of Fed policy action.

In terms of monetary policy moves, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept the short-term interest rate steady at 0.25% in September, after raising it twice this year, in March (10 bps) and July (15 bps). Governor Ueda continues to emphasise a gradual approach to future hikes. He noted that private consumption is slowly increasing and highlighted two key points: the risk of inflation from a weaker JPY has decreased, and the BoJ can take its time with policy decisions. Ueda also expressed concern over the downside risks to overseas economies, especially the U.S. So to predict the BoJ's next moves, we need to watch U.S. economic indicators closely, along with Japan's own economic growth, labour market and inflation trends.

In a remarkable turn of economic events, Japan witnessed the sharpest wage growth in three decades, with base pay hikes significantly boosting service prices and setting the stage for policy normalisation. In August, Japan's annual inflation accelerated to 3%, its highest level in the last 10 months. Core inflation, which excludes food but includes energy costs, rose 2.8% – accelerating from 2.7% in July. Both inflation rates have surpassed the Bank of Japan's 2% target for 29 months.

Looking at growth, Japan's economy expanded by an annualised 2.9% in Q2, a strong rebound from the previous quarter's -2.4%, however at a slightly slower pace than the preliminary estimate of 3.1%. Private consumption, which accounts for more than half of the Japanese economy, increased 0.9%. Additionally, retail spending remained positive for the 28th consecutive month, as higher wages continued to bolster consumer spending.

Looking ahead to the first half of 2025, we forecast that the Bank of Japan will continue its journey towards normalising interest rates, with two more hikes expected within the next twelve months, potentially raising the key rate to 0.75%.

Following the financial market's jitters over U.S. growth concerns, the Bank of Japan's Governor has shown a more measured approach to monetary policy, balancing market stability with domestic economic indicators. The pace at which the Fed reduces interest rates will play a crucial role in the JPY's potential appreciation. We anticipate that the Fed will implement five more rate cuts – of 25 bps each – by September 2025.

However, due to significant yield differentials and Japan's negative real rates, we predict only modest JPY appreciation. In addition, contrary to previous statements, the newly elected LDP chairman Ishiba no longer showed himself to be a friend of a very restrictive monetary policy. Consequently, we expect the USD/JPY exchange rate to move gradually lower only.

Our 12-month target for USD/JPY is 140.



CHF: As strong as ever

CHF: The Swiss National Bank (SNB) was the first G10 central bank to have implemented an interest rate reversal, with – for many market players – an unexpected reduction in its policy rate from 1.75% to 1.50% in March. Many other central banks have since followed suit, most recently the U.S. Federal Reserve with a bold 50 basis point move. Some market players therefore suspected that the SNB would cut interest rates in September by the same amount.

Two factors could have supported such a decision: on the one hand, the continued strength of the Swiss franc (CHF), which is a headwind for the Swiss export industry. At the beginning of August, the CHF was trading at a level of around EUR/CHF 0.921, its highest level for nine years.

On the other hand, after a temporary increase in the spring, inflation rates were again on the decline. Both headline and core inflation were down to just 1.1% in August. According to the SNB, imported goods and services contributed to the decline, as indicated by the strength of the CHF.

The central bank lowered its inflation forecasts significantly and now expects inflation to remain in the price stability range (0-2%) over the entire forecast period. The reduction in the forecasts compared with the June meeting is significant, from 1.1% in 2025 to 0.6% now, and from 1.0% to 0.7% in 2026. For the 2027 kick-off quarters, the SNB forecasts an inflation rate of only 0.6%.

Nevertheless, the SNB refrained from taking a bold interest rate step of 50 bps, but did issue the following statement: "Further cuts in the SNB policy rate may become necessary in the coming quarters to ensure price stability in the medium term." The central bank emphasised again that it could intervene on the currency markets by buying up foreign currencies in the event of the CHF appreciating too much.

The rate cut did not mark the end of the interest rate cut cycle, as indicated by a marked reduction in inflation forecasts over the coming quarters. The statement that "further cuts in the SNB policy rate may become necessary in the coming quarters to ensure price stability over the medium term" opens the door to further rate cuts in subsequent quarters.

The swap markets are therefore pricing in 25 bps of interest rate cuts in both December 2024 and March 2025. That seems relatively plausible.

The strength of the CHF may also necessitate further SNB action. Just recently, the Confederation of the Swiss Watch Industry had noted an eroding competitiveness and called on the SNB to curb the strength of the franc. So far, however, the SNB has been very reluctant to intervene in the currency markets. The central bank apparently does not want to inflate the balance sheet unnecessarily. However, if the EUR/CHF exchange rate approaches 0.90, a rethink could take place. In the period under review, we expect a slight depreciation of the CHF.

Our 12-month target for EUR/CHF is 0.96.

GBP: High interest rates, robust economy

GBP: The British pound was by far the strongest G10 currency this year at the end of September. Against the USD, the GBP has gained around 5% since the beginning of the year. Against the EUR, the GBP climbed to its highest level since April 2022.

Over the past two years, no G10 region has seen its data outperform expectations as much as the UK. The summer has continued this pattern, with the UK a positive outlier in manufacturing and construction. And, while the recent narrative points to a weak fiscal impulse, on balance some of the pessimism over tax hikes may be overdone, potentially further bolstering the case for a more gradual cutting cycle in the UK.

Furthermore, the external balance remains stable, with lower energy prices a support for the current account.

Let's have a look at some recent data: The UK economy was quite robust, with GDP growth of 0.6% and 0.5% quarter-on-quarter respectively in the first two quarters. At 52.8 points, the services PMI remained in expansionary territory for the eleventh month in a row in September, and the industrial PMI also remained above the expansion threshold at 51.5 points despite a slight decline.

Annual inflation remained at 2.2% in August, but core inflation rose from 3.3% to 3.6% and services inflation from 5.2% to 5.6%. Despite this short-term increase on the services front, inflation will continue to fall, but for now remains sticky enough that the UK terminal rate has repriced far less than other high-yielding peers over the summer.

Since its first interest rate cut in August, the Bank of England has paused. Due to the persistently high core and services inflation, the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee voted by a large majority in mid-September in favour of unchanged key interest rates of 5.0%. By the end of the year, the futures markets are still expecting less than 40 bps of interest rate cuts, i.e. less than by the Fed and ECB. For September 2025, key interest rates will continue to be priced in noticeably above 3.50% via OIS, i.e. a relatively long-lasting high key interest rate level (even if, in our opinion, the Fed is priced too low at 3.0% for September 2025).

Markets continue to expect a loosening of fiscal policy at the Autumn Budget, driven by higher borrowing for investment. However, some analysts expect only a modest shift in net spending, with maybe GBP10bn in additional investment funded by extra borrowing. Chancellor Reeves' decision to target winter fuel payments also signals a strong intention from Labour to trim borrowing costs.

To sum up, the GBP is likely to continue to receive tailwinds from robust economic development and a high key interest rate level. The fact that the PMI data for industry, services and construction are all in expansionary territory is an exception to the rule, especially in Europe. We therefore expect the GBP to trade comparatively strongly against many other currencies and see potential to defend its recent gains against the EUR. The GBP may weaken slightly against the USD, primarily due to the strength of the U.S. economy and ongoing inflationary pressures in the U.S.

Our 12-month target for GBP/USD is 1.29.



AUD: RBA's firm hold and commodity tailwind favour AUD

AUD: Australia's economic growth remained sluggish in the June quarter, with GDP rising by 0.2%, unchanged for the third consecutive quarter. The annual growth rate rose 1%, the lowest in 32 years (excluding the pandemic years). The leading economic indicator suggests a softening mood in the private sector – particularly the manufacturing purchasing managers index (PMI) remained in the contractionary zone for the eighth consecutive month. This tepid economic activity is largely due to high interest rates and persistent inflation, which continue to dampen consumer demand.

Annual inflation fell from 3.5% to 2.7% in August, returning to the Reserve Bank of Australia's (RBA) target range of 2-3% for the first time since October 2021. However, as projected by the RBA, headline inflation is expected to continue falling due to federal and state cost of living relief, such as rebates on electricity. Underlying inflation, represented by the trimmed mean, is more indicative of inflation momentum. In this regard, the trimmed mean CPI remains above 3%, despite easing by 40 bps in August. Moreover, inflation expectations remain well above that level – at an outside 4.4% in September.

The slowly fading price pressure is also a consequence of the resilient labour market. Wage growth remained at 4.1% for Q2, while employment growth was higher than analysts' expectations for the fifth consecutive month in August. The unemployment rate stayed at 4.2%, as the participation rate remains at a record high of 67.1%. In August, 47,500 new jobs were added, mostly part-time, which was much higher than the 26,000 predicted.

This is another reason why the RBA, as generally expected, left its key interest rate unchanged at 4.35% in September for the seventh year in a row. The forward guidance remains hawkish, while the board reiterated upside inflation risks and a data-dependent approach. In view of the sluggish disinflation process and resilient labour market, there appears to be no urgency to ease policy by RBA.

Conversely, the Fed is on track to ease policy rates, which could give the AUD a boost. Lastly, the Aussie dollar is often referred to as a 'commodity currency' because base metals like iron ore, natural gas, copper, precious metals (gold), and coal make up a significant portion of Australia's exports. Currently, higher commodity prices, driven by China's stimulus measures as the world's largest consumer, are providing a tailwind for the currency.

Our 12-month target for AUD/USD is 0.68.

NOK: Continued to disappoint

NOK: The poor global backdrop – and particularly the weak current state of the domestic European economy – has continued to weigh on the NOK. In addition, the fall in oil prices during the summer months weighed on NOK's quotations. Long NOK had been a popular trade throughout the year but one could assume the towel has largely been thrown in, probably making re-entering the trade more appealing now.

Nevertheless, NOK performance continues to hinge on the external environment in large part. NOK has the highest beta to VIX across all G10 currencies over the past few months. Nevertheless, the high key interest rate level and some good

fundamentals could not support the krone.

The Norges Bank is still in a quandary: Both headline and core inflation continue to track several tenths below the central bank's forecasts. On the growth side, the weakening in the construction sector outlook suggests rate hikes are biting too. But at the same time, the weaker NOK appears to be preventing Norges from joining peers and starting the cutting cycle. Over recent quarters, the central bank has leaned on the expectation that keeping rates on hold for longer than peers would (re)open a positive carry gap and lead to a stronger NOK. This has, however, failed to materialise.

The continued disinflationary backdrop suggests that Norges will make dovish changes to its rate path projections, which currently only forecast the first full cut by Q2 next year. The rates market appears already primed for a pivot, with a cut fully priced by this year-end (Norges meeting scheduled for December 19).

But outside of hoping for a more constructive external environment (i.e. higher oil and global asset prices), an outright reversal in the weaker NOK trend could nevertheless require more creativity, were the policy rate to become more synchronised with peers. On this front, the governor reiterated that the bar for FX intervention is extremely high. An alternative would be starting to hedge a portion of the enormous sovereign wealth fund.

We see upside potential for NOK over the next 12 months due to the strong fundamentals.

Our 12-month target for EUR/NOK is 11.40.

SEK: Defies Interest rate cuts

SEK: With house prices stabilising, the financial markets have stopped speculating on a significant depreciation of the SEK. This also eased the situation for Riksbank, which had been concerned about the external value of the SEK. After its colleagues in Switzerland made a start in March, the Riksbank was the second G10 central bank to commence its interest rate cut cycle at the beginning of May.

Although this put the SEK under temporary pressure, it did not last long, as the ECB also initiated the interest rate turnaround in June. After a strong first quarter with GDP rising by 0.8% compared to the previous quarter, economic momentum also slowed in Sweden in the second quarter (-0.3% qoq). However, this does not distinguish it from the Eurozone.

Inflation is also clearly receding in Sweden: a further noticeable decline from the headline rate of 1.9% in August and the core rate of 1.2% is expected for September. Recently, the SEK has therefore faced some headwinds as swap markets price in further interest rate cuts totalling 75 bps for the two remaining Riksbank meetings this year, i.e. more than for the ECB. In the end, however, this only means that the markets assume that the Riksbank will cut interest rates faster than the ECB, but that both central banks may end this cycle at the same level.

However, the SEK remains vulnerable to phases of risk-averse sentiment in the markets – next to the NOK, the SEK has the highest "beta". This could – as was recently the case – lead to the SEK losing momentum in the period under review.

Our 12-month target for EUR/SEK is 11.80.



EMs: Strongly divergent exchange rate development

CNY: Change of direction in the third quarter: Since the beginning of the year, the People's Bank of China (PBoC) has had to combat the devaluation of the renminbi.

As recently as July 24, the USD/CNY exchange rate was trading at 7.2775, the lowest level of the renminbi this year. This all changed abruptly at the beginning of August, after the Bank of Japan raised key interest rates (which had a strong pull effect on Asian currencies in general, the four strongest currencies in Q3 were all Asian currencies) and the U.S. Federal Reserve verbally paved the way for its first interest rate cuts.

Following the announcement of monetary and fiscal stimulus from the PBoC and Chinese government agencies, the renminbi received further strong tailwinds at the end of the third quarter, causing it to appreciate towards USD/CNY 7.00 (USD/CNH even traded below this threshold).

According to the assumptions of many market observers, unusually strong price increases in China's leading stock indices are likely to ensure that capital outflows from foreign investors could turn into capital inflows again in the future, which should support the renminbi. The PBoC's cuts in various interest rates were unable to stop the renminbi's advance, nor did the short-term fall in the yield on ten-year Chinese government bonds to a record low of 2.0%.

With the stimulus, the central bank and the government reacted to persistently mediocre economic data. When looking at the macro data for August, it is noticeable that all data was worse than analysts expected in advance. In particular, retail sales rose by only 2.1% compared to the same month last year. This is another indication that Chinese consumers are keeping their wallets closed due to uncertainty about what the future may hold.

The data on industrial production and fixed asset investment (FAI), also missed the forecasts, while the unemployment rate rose unexpectedly. The deep misery of the housing market is illustrated by two data points: Real estate investments fell by 10.2% from January to the end of August compared to the same period last year, while sales of residential properties fell by 25.0% in the same period.

With the recently announced measures, China's economic condition may improve during the next quarters, however their full impact is more likely to materialise in the medium term.

We should also not forget that the U.S. elections on November 5 are likely to have a significant impact on the renminbi's price. Should Trump return to the White House and implement the drastic increase in tariffs on imports from China he has threatened, we consider it likely that the CNY would depreciate at least moderately against the USD, as foreign investors may fear increased tensions between Washington and Beijing, potentially leading to rising capital outflows from China again.

Overall, this could cause the current tailwinds for the CNY to ease somewhat.

Our 12-month target for USD/CNY is 7.15.

ZAR: An absolute game changer in South Africa was the general election in May. After the ANC fell short of an absolute majority for the first time in decades and had to form a coalition with the Democratic Alliance and some other parties, this advent of this new government has driven major gains in the financial markets. These gains reflect market hopes that urgently needed reforms will now actually be initiated.

While the rand had traded near a yearly low of USD/ZAR 19.80 at the end of April, it climbed to a 27-month high of around USD/ZAR 17.03 by the end of September.

The ZAR is also receiving support from the macro data: after zero growth in Q1, the economy grew by 0.4% in Q2. The planned power shutdowns ("load shedding") have been greatly reduced. And the inflation rate recently fell unexpectedly significantly to 4.4% (headline) and 4.1% (core) and thus into the lower half of the South African Reserve Bank target zone. Consequently, the central bank was able to cautiously initiate the interest rate turnaround in September by lowering the key interest rate from 8.25% to 8.00%.

However, one risk for the ZAR is a more risk-averse mood in the markets, possibly caused by geopolitical tensions. In addition, the new government must really deliver reforms.

Our 12-month target for USD/ZAR is 18.80.

BRL: Latin America's largest economy, Brazil, witnessed a stalled economy for the last two quarters in 2023. This changed noticeably in 2024 – despite persistently high key interest rates, which we will come to in a moment. In both Q1 (+1.0%) and Q2 (+1.4%), the economy grew more strongly than expected by the market consensus.

Compared to Q2 2023 Brazil's economy grew by 3.3% in Q2 2024. Robust data on industrial production and retail sales in particular were helpful in this regard. Both the industrial and services PMI remain significantly above the 50-point mark and thus in the expansion zone.

On the inflation front, Brazil maintains a benign picture. The annual inflation rate eased in August from 4.50% to 4.24%, which aligns with the upper bound of the central bank's inflation target (3.0% + 1.5%). However, core service inflation, closely monitored by the central bank, remains elevated, as the labour market remains tight and wage growth continues to outpace inflation.

Not least for this reason – albeit among a few others – the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) changed course: After a total of seven interest rate cuts had brought the key interest rate down to 10.50%, the BCB pivoted in September with an increase to 10.75%.

The depreciation of the BRL, which weakened about 10% against the USD between the beginning of the year to the end of September, is also likely to play a role here.

We expect that the BRL may find a bottom at the current level and should therefore also be close in the medium term.

Our 12-month target for USD/BRL is 5.50.



MXN: In 2023, the Mexican peso claimed the title of the best-performing currency, appreciating by nearly 15% against the formidable USD. However, in 2024, the MXN had depreciated by 13% by the end of Q3.

One of the reasons for the devaluation of the MXN is political. The significant gains made by the ruling party Morena in the general election, which would theoretically make changes to the constitution relatively easy, was met with fears in the financial markets that these could lead to changes that could be disadvantageous for financial markets.

Claudia Sheinbaum has now been sworn in as president of Mexico. The next few months are likely to be challenging: On the one hand, there is a need to tighten the budget of her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador. The previously estimated deficit ratio of 4.9% is unlikely to help regain the confidence of international investors. In addition to measures to increase the efficiency of Mexican state-owned enterprises, it is also important to strengthen the framework conditions for the private sector.

Last year's strong performance by the currency was driven by a significant interest rate hike of 725 bps by the central bank, aimed at combating high inflation, which had reached 8.7% – exceeding the central bank's target range of 3.0% ± 1.0 ppt by a long way.

The inflation rate remained a brake on the Mexican economy. However, after reaching a 14-month high of 5.6% in July, it fell to 5.0% in August. It is also encouraging that domestic price pressure has returned to the central bank Banxico's target range of 2-4 % for the first time since February 2021 at 4.0%.

Against the backdrop of the expected gradual easing of the Fed, Banxico lowered the key interest rate from 10.75% to 10.50% in September. The still high level of key interest rates could strengthen the MXN somewhat following its recent significant depreciation.

However, the U.S. elections could remain a sword of Damocles hanging over the MXN. Mexico surpassed China to become the top trading partner of the U.S. for the first time in over 20 years. Nearly 80% of Mexican exports now find their way to their northern neighbour, the U.S.

The upcoming electoral race in the U.S., along with potential tariff discussions, may exert renewed pressure on the MXN.

However, this risk should already be largely priced into current exchange rates, which is why we do not see the MXN moving far from the current level in the medium term.

Our 12-month target for USD/MXN is 19.20.

IDR: Indonesia's economy showcased resilience in Q2, with growth holding steady just above 5%, aligning with expectations. Since June 2023, inflation has remained comfortably within Bank Indonesia's (BI) target range, creating scope to monetary policy easing and supporting growth.

However, BI has been keen on maintaining the stability of the IDR, especially after it plunged over 6.8% against the USD between the start of the year and the end of June. The Federal Reserve's pivot and projected series of U.S. rate cuts provided BI with an opportunity to cut rates with less concern about currency depreciation. Consequently, BI cut its policy rate by 25 bps in September, earlier than anticipated.

The central bank stated that this decision was aligned with the stable IDR (which has recouped its initial losses from June lows


and the need to support economic growth, while keeping its macroeconomic forecasts unchanged from the previous meeting.

Despite Indonesia's real rates being at their highest in recent history, the rate differential to the Fed funds rate is relatively lower around 100bps from above 200bps before covid. It is likely that BI will prioritise restoring a wider rate differential during this easing cycle to maintain IDR stability and continue attracting capital inflows, rather than matching the Fed's rate cuts in depth.

Our 12-month target for USD/IDR is 15,500.




Figure 1: EUR/USD vs. spread on 10yr government bonds Germany-U.S.



Source: Refinitiv Datastream, Deutsche Bank AG. Data as of October 08, 2024.

Figure 2: Performance vs. USD YTD (%)



Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Deutsche Bank AG. Data as of October 08, 2024.

Figure 3: End-September 2025 forecasts

Currencies	End-September 2025
EUR vs. USD	1.08
USD vs. JPY	140
EUR vs. JPY	151
EUR vs. GBP	0.84
GBP vs. USD	1.29
EUR vs. CHF	0.96
AUD vs. USD	0.68
USD vs. CAD	1.31
EUR vs. NOK	11.40
EUR vs. SEK	11.80
USD vs. CNY	7.15
USD vs. IDR	15,500
NZD vs. USD	0.63
USD vs. ZAR	18.80
USD vs. MXN	19.20
USD vs. BRL	5.50

Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Deutsche Bank AG. Data as of September 5, 2024.

In Europe, Middle East and Africa as well as in Asia Pacific this material is considered marketing material, but this is not the case in the U.S. No assurance can be given that any forecast or target can be achieved. Forecasts are based on assumptions, estimates, opinions and hypothetical models which may prove to be incorrect. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. Performance refers to a nominal value based on price gains/losses and does not take into account inflation. Inflation will have a negative impact on the purchasing power of this nominal monetary value. Depending on the current level of inflation, this may lead to a real loss in value, even if the nominal performance of the investment is positive. Investments come with risk. The value of an investment can fall as well as rise and you might not get back the amount originally invested at any point in time. Your capital may be at risk.



Glossary

AUD is the currency code for the Australian dollar.

The **Bank of Japan (BoJ)** is the central bank of Japan.

BRL is the currency code for the Brazilian real.

CAD is the currency code for the Canadian dollar.

CHF is the currency code for the Swiss franc.

CNY is the currency code for the Chinese yuan.

The **consumer price index (CPI)** measures the price of a basket of products and services that is based on the typical consumption of a private household.

An **emerging market (EM)** is a country that has some characteristics of a developed market in terms of market efficiency, liquidity and other factors, but does not meet all developed market criteria.

EUR is the currency code for the euro, the currency of the Eurozone.

The **European Central Bank (ECB)** is the central bank for the Eurozone.

The **Eurozone** is formed of 19 European Union member states that have adopted the euro as their common currency and sole legal tender.

Federal Reserve (Fed) is the central bank of the United States. Its **Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)** meets to determine interest rate policy.

The **G10** comprises of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

GBP is the currency code for the British pound/sterling.

Gross domestic product (GDP) is the monetary value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country's borders in a specific time period.

IDR is the currency code for the Indonesia Rupiah.

JPY is the currency code for the Japanese yen, the Japanese currency.

KRW is the currency code for the Korean won.

LNG stands for Liquefied natural gas.

MXN is the currency code for the Mexican peso.

NOK is the currency code for the Norwegian Krone.

Purchasing manager indices (PMI) provide an indicator of the economic health of the manufacturing sector and are based on five major indicators: new orders, inventory levels, production, supplier deliveries and the employment environment. The composite PMI includes both manufacturing and services sectors. They can be published by public sector or private agencies (e.g. Caixin, Nikkei).

Producer price inflation (PPI) measures the change in prices received by producers (e.g. firms) for their output.

The **Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)** is the central bank of Australia.

The **Riksbank** is the central bank of Sweden.

The **S&P 500** Index includes 500 leading U.S. companies capturing approximately 80% coverage of available U.S. market capitalization.

SEK is the currency code for the Swedish krona.

The **Swiss National Bank (SNB)** is the central bank of Switzerland.

SGD is the currency code for the Singapore dollar.

Treasuries are bonds issued by the U.S. government.

TRY is the currency code for the Turkish lira.

U.S. is the United States.

USD is the currency code for the U.S. Dollar.

ZAR is the currency code for the South African rand.



Important information

General

This document may not be distributed in Canada or Japan. This document is intended for retail or professional clients only. This document is being circulated in good faith by Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft, its branches (as permitted in any relevant jurisdiction), affiliated companies and its officers and employees (collectively, "Deutsche Bank").

This material is for your information only and is not intended as an offer, or recommendation or solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any investment, security, financial instrument or other specific product, to conclude a transaction, or to provide any investment service or investment advice, or to provide any research, investment research or investment recommendation, in any jurisdiction, but is intended solely for information purposes. The information does not replace advice tailored to the individual circumstances of the investor.

All materials in this communication are meant to be reviewed in their entirety.

If a court of competent jurisdiction deems any provision of this disclaimer unenforceable, the remaining provisions will remain in full force and effect. This document has been prepared as a general market commentary without consideration of the investment needs, objectives or financial circumstances of any particular investor. Investments are subject to market risks which derive from the instrument or are specific to the instrument or attached to the particular issuer. Should such risks materialise, investors may incur losses, including (without limitation) a total loss of the invested capital. The value of investments can fall as well as rise and you may not recover the amount originally invested at any point in time. This document does not identify all the risks (direct or indirect) or other considerations which may be material to an investor when making an investment decision.

This document and all information included herein are provided "as is", "as available" and no representation or warranty of any kind, express, implied or statutory, is made by Deutsche Bank regarding any statement or information contained herein or in conjunction with this document. To the extent permissible under applicable laws and regulations, we are making no representation as to the profitability of any financial instrument or economic measure. All opinions, market prices, estimates, forward looking statements, hypothetical statements, forecast returns or other opinions leading to financial conclusions contained herein reflect Deutsche Bank's subjective judgment as of the date of this document. Without limitation, Deutsche Bank does not warrant the accuracy, adequacy, completeness, reliability, timeliness or availability of this communication or any information in this document and expressly disclaims liability for errors or omissions herein. Forward looking statements involve significant elements of subjective judgments and analyses and changes thereto and/or consideration of different or additional factors could have a material impact on the results indicated. Therefore, actual results may vary, perhaps materially, from the results contained herein.

Unless otherwise indicated in this document, all statements of opinion reflect the current assessment of Deutsche Bank, which may change at any time. Deutsche Bank does not assume any obligation to either update the information contained in this document or inform investors about available updated information. The information contained in this document is subject to change without notice and based on a number of assumptions, estimates, opinions and hypothetical models or analyses which – although, From the Bank's current point of view are based on adequate information – may not prove valid or turnout in the future to be accurate or correct and may be different from conclusions expressed by other departments within Deutsche Bank. Although the information contained in this document has been derived from sources that Deutsche Bank considers trustworthy and reliable, Deutsche Bank does not guarantee the completeness, fairness, or accuracy of the information and it should not be relied upon as such. This document may provide, for your convenience, references to websites and other external sources. Deutsche Bank takes no responsibility for their content and their content does not form any part of this document. Accessing such external sources is at your own risk.

To the extent permissible under applicable laws and regulations, this document is for discussion purposes only and is not intended to create any legally binding obligations on Deutsche Bank and Deutsche Bank is not acting as your financial advisor or in a fiduciary capacity unless otherwise expressly agreed by Deutsche Bank in writing. Before making an investment decision, investors need to consider, with or without the assistance of a financial professional, whether any investments and strategies described or provided by Deutsche Bank, are appropriate, in light of the investor's particular investment needs, objectives, financial circumstances, the possible risks and benefits of such investment decision. When making an investment decision, potential investors should not rely on this document but only on what is contained in the final offering documentation relating to the investment. As a global financial services provider, Deutsche Bank from time to time faces actual and potential conflicts of interest. Deutsche Bank's policy is to take all appropriate steps to maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements to identify and manage such conflicts. Senior management within Deutsche Bank are responsible for ensuring that Deutsche Bank's systems, controls and procedures are adequate to identify and manage conflicts of interest. Deutsche Bank does not give tax or legal advice, including in this document, and nothing in this document should be interpreted as Deutsche Bank providing any person with any investment advice. Investors should seek advice from their own tax experts, lawyers, and investment advisers in considering investments and strategies described by Deutsche Bank. Unless notified to the contrary in a particular case, investment instruments are not insured by any governmental entity, not subject to deposit protection schemes and not guaranteed, including by Deutsche Bank. This document may not be reproduced or circulated without Deutsche Bank's express written authorisation. Deutsche Bank expressly prohibits the distribution and transfer of this material to third parties. Deutsche Bank accepts no liability whatsoever arising from the use or distribution of this material or for any action taken or decision made in respect of investments mentioned in this document which the investor may have made or may make in the future.

The manner of circulation and distribution of this document may be restricted by law or regulation in certain countries, including, without limitation, the United States. This document is not directed to, or intended for distribution to or use by, any person or entity who is a citizen or resident of or located in any locality, state, country, or other jurisdiction where such distribution, publication, availability or use would be contrary to law or regulation or which would subject Deutsche Bank to any registration or licensing requirement within such jurisdiction not currently met. Persons into whose possession this document may come are required to inform themselves of, and to observe, such restrictions. Past performance is no guarantee of future results; nothing contained herein shall constitute any representation, warranty, or prediction as to future performance. Further information is available upon investor's request.

Deutsche Bank AG is a stock corporation ("Aktiengesellschaft") incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany with its head office in Frankfurt am Main. It is registered with the district court ("Amtsgericht") in Frankfurt am Main under number HRB 30 000 and licensed to carry out banking business and to provide financial services. Supervisory authorities are the European Central Bank ("ECB"), Sonnemannstrasse 22, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany (www.ecb.europa.eu) and the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ("Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht" or "BaFin"), Grauheindorfer Strasse 108, 53117 Bonn and Marie-Curie-Strasse 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt am Main (www.bafin.de), and by the German Central Bank ("Deutsche Bundesbank"), Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main (www.bundesbank.de).

This document has neither been submitted to nor reviewed or approved by any of the above or below mentioned supervisory authorities.



Important information

For Residents of the United Arab Emirates

This document is strictly private and confidential and is being distributed to a limited number of investors and must not be provided to any person other than the original recipient, and may not be reproduced or used for any other purpose. By receiving this document, the person or entity to whom it has been issued understands, acknowledges and agrees that this document has not been approved by the UAE Central Bank, the UAE Securities and Commodities Authority, the UAE Ministry of Economy or any other authorities in the UAE. No marketing of any financial products or services has been or will be made from within the United Arab Emirates and no subscription to any funds, securities, products or financial services may or will be consummated within the United Arab Emirates. This does not constitute a public offer of securities in the United Arab Emirates in accordance with the Commercial Companies Law, Federal Law No. 2 of 2015 (as amended from time to time) or otherwise. This document may only be distributed to "Professional Investors", as defined in the UAE Securities and Commodities Authority's Rulebook on Financial Activities and Reconciliation Mechanism (as amended from time to time).

For Residents of Kuwait

This document has been sent to you at your own request. This presentation is not for general circulation to the public in Kuwait. The Interests have not been licensed for offering in Kuwait by the Kuwait Capital Markets Authority or any other relevant Kuwaiti government agency. The offering of the Interests in Kuwait on the basis a private placement or public offering is, therefore, restricted in accordance with Decree Law No. 31 of 1990 and the implementing regulations thereto (as amended) and Law No. 7 of 2010 and the bylaws thereto (as amended). No private or public offering of the Interests is being made in Kuwait, and no agreement relating to the sale of the Interests will be concluded in Kuwait. No marketing or solicitation or inducement activities are being used to offer or market the Interests in Kuwait.

For Residents of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

This document may not be distributed in the Kingdom except to such persons as are permitted under the Investment Fund Regulations issued by the Capital Market Authority. The Capital Market Authority does not take any responsibility for the contents of this document, does not make any representation as to its accuracy or completeness, and expressly disclaims any liability whatsoever for any loss arising from, or incurred in reliance upon, any part of this document. Prospective subscribers of the securities should conduct their own due diligence on the accuracy of any information relating to securities. If you do not understand the contents of this document, you should consult an authorised financial adviser.

For Residents of Qatar

This document has not been filed with, reviewed or approved by the Qatar Central Bank, the Qatar Financial Markets Authority, the Qatar Financial Centre Regulatory Authority or any other relevant Qatari governmental body or securities exchange or under any laws of the State of Qatar. This document does not constitute a public offering and is addressed only to the party to whom it has been delivered. No transaction will be concluded in Qatar and any inquiries or applications should be received, and allotments made, outside Qatar.

For Residents of the Kingdom of Bahrain

This document does not constitute an offer for sale of, or participation in, securities, derivatives or funds marketed in Bahrain within the meaning of Bahrain Monetary Agency Regulations. All applications for investment should be received and any allotments should be made, in each case from outside of Bahrain. This document has been prepared for private information purposes of intended investors only who will be institutions. No invitation shall be made to the public in the Kingdom of Bahrain and this document will not be issued, passed to, or made available to the public generally. The Central Bank (CBB) has not reviewed, nor has it approved, this document or the marketing of such securities, derivatives or funds in the Kingdom of Bahrain.

For Residents of South Africa

This document does not constitute or form a part of any offer, solicitation or promotion in South Africa. This document has not been filed with, reviewed or approved by the South African Reserve Bank, the Financial Sector Conduct Authority or any other relevant South African governmental body or securities exchange or under any laws of the Republic of South Africa.

For Residents of Belgium

This document has been distributed in Belgium by Deutsche Bank AG acting through its Brussels Branch. Deutsche Bank AG is a stock corporation ("Aktiengesellschaft") incorporated under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany and licensed to carry on banking business and to provide financial services subject to the supervision and control of the European Central Bank ("ECB") and the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ("BaFin"). Deutsche Bank AG, Brussels Branch, is also supervised in Belgium by the Financial Services and Markets Authority ("FSMA", www.fsma.be). The branch has its registered address at Marnixlaan 13-15, B-1000 Brussels and is registered under number VAT BE 0418.371.094, RPM/RPR Brussels. Further details are available on request or can be found at www.deutschebank.be.

For Residents of the United Kingdom

This document is a financial promotion as defined in Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and is approved by and communicated to you by DB UK Bank Limited. DB UK Bank Limited is a member of the Deutsche Bank group and is registered at Company House in England & Wales with company number 315841 with its registered Office: 21 Moorfields, London, United Kingdom, EC2Y 9DB. DB UK Bank Limited is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. DB UK Bank Limited's Financial Services Registration Number is 140848.

Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft is incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany and its members' liability is limited.



Important information

For Residents of Hong Kong

This material is intended for: Professional Investors in Hong Kong. Furthermore, this material is provided to addressee only, further distribution of this material is strictly prohibited. This document and its contents are provided for information only. Nothing in this document is intended to be an offer of any investment or a solicitation or recommendation to buy or to sell an investment and should not be interpreted or construed as an offer, solicitation, or recommendation.

The contents of this document have not been reviewed by any regulatory authority in Hong Kong. You are advised to exercise caution in relation to the investments contained herein (if any). If you are in any doubt about any of the contents of this document, you should obtain independent professional advice.

This document has not been approved by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong ("SFC"), nor has a copy of this document been registered by the Registrar of Companies in Hong Kong, unless specified otherwise. The investments contained herein may or may not be authorised by the SFC. The investments may not be offered or sold in Hong Kong, by means of any document, other than (i) to "professional investors" as defined in the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571 of the Laws of Hong Kong) ("SFO") and any rules made under the SFO, or (ii) in other circumstances which do not result in the document being a "prospectus" as defined in the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32 of the Laws of Hong Kong) (the "C(WUMP)O") or which do not constitute an offer to the public within the meaning of the C(WUMP)O. No person shall issue or possess for the purposes of issue, whether in Hong Kong or elsewhere, any advertisement, invitation or document relating to the investments, which is directed at, or the contents of which are likely to be accessed or read by, the public of Hong Kong (except if permitted to do so under the securities laws of Hong Kong) other than with respect to investments which are or are intended to be disposed of only to persons outside Hong Kong or only to "professional investors" as defined in the SFO and any rules made under the SFO.

For Residents of Singapore

This material is intended for: Accredited Investors / Institutional Investors in Singapore. Furthermore, this material is provided to addressee only, further distribution of this material is strictly prohibited.

For Residents of the United States of America

In the United States, brokerage services are offered through Deutsche Bank Securities Inc., a broker-dealer and registered investment adviser, which conducts securities activities in the United States. Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. is a member of FINRA, NYSE and SIPC. Banking and lending services are offered through Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas, member FDIC, and other members of the Deutsche Bank Group. In respect of the United States, see earlier statements made in this document. Deutsche Bank makes no representations or warranties that the information contained herein is appropriate or available for use in countries outside of the United States, or that services discussed in this document are available or appropriate for sale or use in all jurisdictions, or by all counterparties. Unless registered, licensed as otherwise may be permissible in accordance with applicable law, none of Deutsche Bank or its affiliates is offering any services in the United States or that are designed to attract US persons (as such term is defined under Regulation S of the United States Securities Act of 1933, as amended). This United States-specific disclaimer will be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware, without regard to any conflicts of law provisions that would mandate the application of the law of another jurisdiction.

For Residents of Germany

This information is advertising. The texts do not meet all legal requirements to ensure the impartiality of investment and investment strategy recommendations or financial analyses. There is no prohibition for the compiler or for the company responsible for the compilation to trade with the respective financial instruments before or after the publication of these documents.

General information on financial instruments is contained in the brochures "Basic Information on Securities and Other Investments", "Basic Information on Financial Derivatives", "Basic Information on Forward Transactions" and the information sheet "Risks in Forward Transactions", which the customer can request from the Bank free of charge.

Past performance or simulated performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

For Residents of India

The investments mentioned in this document are not being offered to the Indian public for sale or subscription. This document is not registered and/or approved by the Securities and Exchange Board of India, the Reserve Bank of India, or any other governmental/ regulatory authority in India. This document is not and should not be deemed to be a "prospectus" as defined under the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013) and the same shall not be filed with any regulatory authority in India. Pursuant to the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the regulations issued there under, any investor resident in India may be required to obtain prior special permission of the Reserve Bank of India before making investments outside of India including any investments mentioned in this document.

For Residents of Italy

This report is distributed in Italy by Deutsche Bank S.p.A., a bank incorporated and registered under Italian law subject to the supervision and control of Banca d'Italia and CONSOB. Its registered office is located at Piazza del Calendario 3 – 20126 Milan (Italy) and is registered with the Chamber of Commerce of Milan, VAT and fiscal code number 001340740156, part of the interbank fund of deposits protection, enrolled in the Bank Register and the head of Deutsche Bank Banking Group, enrolled in the register of the Banking Groups pursuant to Legislative Decree September 1st, 1993 n. 385 and subject to the direction and coordination activity of Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt am Main (Germany).

For Residents of Luxembourg

This report is distributed in Luxembourg by Deutsche Bank Luxembourg S.A., a bank incorporated under the laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg in the form of a public limited company (Société Anonyme), subject to the supervision and control of the European Central Bank ("ECB") and Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier ("CSSF"). Its registered office is located at 2, boulevard Konrad Adenauer, 1115 Luxembourg, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg and is registered with Luxembourg Registre de Commerce et des Sociétés ("RCS") under number B 9.164 .

For Residents of Spain

Deutsche Bank, Sociedad Anónima Española Unipersonal is a credit institution regulated by the Bank of Spain and the CNMV and registered in their respective Official Registries under the Code 019. Deutsche Bank, Sociedad Anónima Española Unipersonal may only undertake the financial services and banking activities that fall within the scope of its existing license. The principal place of business in Spain is located in Paseo de la Castellana number 18, 28046 - Madrid. Registered in the Mercantile Registry of Madrid, Volume 28100, Book 0, Folio 1, Section 8, Sheet M506294, Registration 2. NIF: A08000614. This information has been distributed by Deutsche Bank, Sociedad Anónima Española Unipersonal.

For Residents of Portugal

Deutsche Bank AG, Portugal Branch is a credit institution regulated by the Bank of Portugal and the Portuguese Securities Commission ("CMVM"), registered with numbers 43 and 349, respectively and with commercial registry number 980459079. Deutsche Bank AG, Portugal Branch may only undertake the financial services and banking activities that fall within the scope of its existing license. The registered address is Rua Castilho, 20, 1250-069 Lisbon, Portugal.

In Europe, Middle East and Africa as well as in Asia Pacific this material is considered marketing material, but this is not the case in the U.S. No assurance can be given that any forecast or target can be achieved. Forecasts are based on assumptions, estimates, opinions and hypothetical models which may prove to be incorrect. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. Performance refers to a nominal value based on price gains/losses and does not take into account inflation. Inflation will have a negative impact on the purchasing power of this nominal monetary value. Depending on the current level of inflation, this may lead to a real loss in value, even if the nominal performance of the investment is positive. Investments come with risk. The value of an investment can fall as well as rise and you might not get back the amount originally invested at any point in time. Your capital may be at risk.



Important information

For Residents of Austria

This document is distributed by Deutsche Bank AG Vienna Branch, registered in the commercial register of the Vienna Commercial Court under number FN 140266z. Deutsche Bank AG's Vienna branch is also supervised by the Austrian Financial Market Authority (FMA), Otto-Wagner-Platz 5, 1090 Vienna. This document has neither been submitted to nor approved by the aforementioned supervisory authorities.

For Residents of the Netherlands

This document is distributed by Deutsche Bank AG, Amsterdam Branch, with registered address at De entree 195 (1101 HE) in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and registered in the Netherlands trade register under number 33304583 and in the register within the meaning of Section 1:107 of the Netherlands Financial Supervision Act (Wet op het financieel toezicht). This register can be consulted through www.dnb.nl.

For Residents of France

Deutsche Bank AG is an authorised credit institution, subject to the overall supervision of the European Central Bank and BaFin, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. Its various branches are locally supervised, for certain activities, by the competent banking authorities, such as the Prudential Control and Resolution Authority (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel de Résolution, "ACPR") and the Financial Markets Authority (Autorité des Marchés Financiers, "AMF") in France.

Any reproduction, representation, distribution or redistribution, in whole or in part, of the contents of this document in any medium or by any process whatsoever, as well as any sale, resale, retransmission or making available to third parties in any manner whatsoever, is prohibited. This document may not be reproduced or distributed without our written permission.

© 2024 Deutsche Bank AG. All rights reserved.

055776 101024

AU/ST

In Europe, Middle East and Africa as well as in Asia Pacific this material is considered marketing material, but this is not the case in the U.S. No assurance can be given that any forecast or target can be achieved. Forecasts are based on assumptions, estimates, opinions and hypothetical models which may prove to be incorrect. Past performance is not indicative of future returns. Performance refers to a nominal value based on price gains/losses and does not take into account inflation. Inflation will have a negative impact on the purchasing power of this nominal monetary value. Depending on the current level of inflation, this may lead to a real loss in value, even if the nominal performance of the investment is positive. Investments come with risk. The value of an investment can fall as well as rise and you might not get back the amount originally invested at any point in time. Your capital may be at risk.